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1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
August Term, 2011
(Argued: May 3, 2012 Decided: January 29, 2013)
Docket No. 11-2215
MARY JO C., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- v -
NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CENTRAL ISLIP PUBLIC
LIBRARY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SACK, RAGGI, Circuit Judges, and SWAIN, District
Judge.*
Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
(Sandra J. Feuerstein, Judge) dismissing the plaintiff’s claims 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6). The district court concluded principally that Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require state 
actors to violate state laws as a "reasonable modification” under 
the Act, and that Title II does not apply to employment
* The Honorable Laura Taylor Swain, United States District 
Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by 
designation.
AUTHENTICATED , 
U.S. GOVERNM ENT^ 
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discrimination. Because we conclude that Title II does, in some
circumstances, require reasonable departures from standards
established by state laws, we vacate the district court’s
judgment of dismissal in that respect. Because we conclude,
based principally on the structure of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, that Title II does not apply to employment
discrimination, we affirm the district court’s judgment of
dismissal of that claim.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part.
WILLIAM M. BROOKS, Mental Disability Law 
Clinic, Touro College, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center, Central Islip, NY, 
for Plaintiff-Appellant.
CECELIA C. CHANG, Deputy Solicitor 
General, (Barbara D. Underwood,
Solicitor General, Laura R. Johnson, 
Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel, 
on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, 
Attorney General of the State of New 
York, New York, NY, for Defendant- 
Appellee New York State and Local 
Retirement System.
LAURA L. SHOCKLEY, (William M. Savino, 
Harris J. Zakarin, on the brief), Rivkin 
Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY, for 
Defendant-Appellee Central Islip Public 
Library.
SASHA SAMBERG-CHAMPION, (Jessica Dunsay 
Silver, on the brief), Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Appellate Section, for Thomas E. Perez, 
Assistant Attorney General, Washington, 
DC, for Amicus Curiae United States 
Department of Justice.
Jo Anne Simon, Jo Anne Simon P.C., 
Brooklyn, NY, for Amici Curiae 
Disability Advocates, Inc., DRVT, 
National Disability Rights Network, and
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State of Connecticut Office of 
Protection and Advocacy for Persons with 
Disabilities.
SACK, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff alleges that her job as a librarian at 
the Central Islip Public Library (the "Library") was terminated 
because of behavior symptomatic of her chronic mental illness. 
Although she alleges that she would have been eligible for 
disability retirement benefits under New York State law, her 
mental illness interfered with her ability to comply with New 
York State law's strictly enforced filing deadline for those 
benefits. When the New York State and Local Retirement System 
(the "NYSLRS") rejected her request to waive the deadline, and 
when the Library rejected her request to assist her in applying 
or extending the deadline by reclassifying her termination as a 
leave of absence, the plaintiff was denied those benefits.
Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted this lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York against the NYSLRS and the Library alleging, inter alia, 
that the defendants' actions violated Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327, 327-28 (1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. The district
court (Sandra J. Feuerstein, Judge) granted the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss because the court concluded principally that 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require 
modifications of mandatory requirements imposed by state laws, 
and that Title II does not apply to employment discrimination.
3
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Case: 11-2215 Document: 166-1 Page: 4 01/29/2013 829536 57
For the reasons set forth below, the district court’s 
judgment of dismissal is vacated as to the plaintiff’s Title II 
claim against the NYSLRS. The case is remanded with instructions 
to the district court to grant the plaintiff leave to amend her 
complaint if she so wishes to allege facts supporting her claim 
that she was disabled, and to attempt to state a claim invoking 
the rule of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and to conduct 
further proceedings as warranted. The district court’s judgment 
of dismissal is affirmed as to the plaintiff’s Title II claim 
against the Library. The district court’s decision to decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law 
claims is vacated for reconsideration depending on the course of 
the further proceedings contemplated by this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Because this is an appeal from the district court’s 
grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, we state the facts as 
drawn from the complaint of the plaintiff "Mary Jo C.” -­
"accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) -- and as drawn 
from matters of which we may take judicial notice, see Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)
(”[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well 
as other sources . . . , in particular, documents incorporated
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into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may 
take judicial notice.”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 
493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (”[W]e may consider . . .
documents possessed by or known to the plaintiff and upon which 
it relied in bringing the suit.”).
The plaintiff is a ”57[-]year-old individual who has 
suffered from mental illness since adolescence.” Complaint 5 12, 
Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Ret. Sys., No. 09 Cv. 5635 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (”Compl.”). She was employed by various
Long Island libraries between 1986 and November 2006, becoming a 
member of defendant NYSLRS in January 1988. Id. 13-14. While 
working for the Library, her employment was terminated in 
November 2006 ”[a]s a result of behaviors that were symptomatic 
of her mental illness.” Id. 5 16. Her last day of work at the 
Library was on or about November 12, 2006. Id. 5 17. After her 
termination, ”libraries in Suffolk County communicated among 
themselves and agreed that [the plaintiff] should not be hired as 
a librarian.” Id. 5 40. The plaintiff asserts that because the 
libraries "blackballed [her] from working in the public library 
system in Suffolk County,” ”it is a virtual certainty that [she] 
will never work again.” Id. 55 40-41.
In some circumstances, New York provides disability 
retirement benefits for members of the NYSLRS who are ”physically 
or mentally incapacitated for the performance of gainful 
employment.” See N.Y. Ret. and Soc. Sec. Law § 605(b)(1),
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(b)(3)(c). According to the Complaint, the plaintiff would have 
been eligible for disability retirement benefits under New York 
law had she filed an application with the NYSLRS within three 
months of her last day of employment. Compl. 18-19. But she 
"failed to recognize” the filing deadline "because of her mental 
illness." Id. 5 20.
During the three-month period following her 
termination, the plaintiff’s brother spoke to an NYSLRS official, 
who informed him that the Library could file an application on 
the plaintiff’s behalf. Id. 55 21-24. On or about February 11, 
2007, the plaintiff’s brother asked the Library to do so, but the 
Library denied the request. Id. 55 25-26. The plaintiff’s 
brother then asked the Library to reclassify the plaintiff’s 
termination as an unpaid leave of absence, which would have 
extended the time during which the plaintiff could file for 
benefits, see N.Y. Ret. and Soc. Sec. Law § 605(b)(2), but the 
Library refused to do that too. Compl. 55 27-29.
The plaintiff’s condition improved in November 2007, 
and she applied for disability retirement benefits. Id. 5 30.
The NYSLRS denied the application because it was not filed within 
three months of the plaintiff’s last day of work. Id. 5 31. On 
or about July 23, 2008, the plaintiff requested that the NYSLRS 
waive the filing deadline as an accommodation under the ADA. The 
NYSLRS did not respond. Id. 55 32-33.
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While awaiting the NYSLRS's response, the plaintiff's 
brother received notice that the plaintiff could appeal the 
denial of her disability retirement benefits application, and the 
plaintiff did so. Id. 34-35. The NYSLRS argued before the 
hearing officer that state law prohibited it from waiving the 
filing deadline for any reason. Id. 5 36. The hearing officer 
agreed, denying the plaintiff's appeal because there was no 
"provision for an extension of the filing deadline” under the 
applicable state statutes and regulations. Id. 55 37-38.
Thereafter, on December 23, 2009, the plaintiff brought 
the instant action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York against the NYSLRS and the Library. 
The complaint alleges that (1) the NYSLRS violated the ADA by 
failing to "provide a requested reasonable accommodation" by 
waiving the filing deadline, (2) the Library violated the ADA and 
New York Executive Law section 296 by failing to file an 
application on the plaintiff's behalf, and (3) the Library 
violated the ADA and New York Executive Law section 296 by 
failing to reclassify the plaintiff's termination as a leave of 
absence. Id. 55 43-52. The plaintiff requested various 
declaratory judgments, an injunction requiring the NYSLRS to 
waive the filing deadline (or, if the court determined that an 
injunction was inappropriate under the ADA, damages), and 
attorney's fees and costs. Id. at pp. 10-12.
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Both defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6); the NYSLRS also moved to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(1), asserting that the plaintiff lacked standing and 
that New York’s sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff’s claims. 
On May 5, 2011, the district court denied the NYSLRS’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 
the plaintiff had standing to bring her claims. But the court 
granted the NYSLRS’s motion to dismiss because it concluded that 
the plaintiff could not state a claim under Title II of the ADA, 
and that the court therefore need not determine whether Congress 
validly abrogated New York’s sovereign immunity when it enacted 
Title II. The court reasoned that (1) the filing deadline was an 
essential eligibility requirement not subject to waiver under the 
ADA, (2) the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation was not 
"reasonable" under the ADA because it would require the NYSLRS to 
violate state law, and (3) the plaintiff did not allege facts 
sufficiently plausible on their face to demonstrate, if proven, 
that she was disabled within the meaning of Title II of the ADA. 
Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Ret. Sys., 2011 WL 
1748572, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2011). As
for the Library’s motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s Title II claims against the library failed because 
her exclusive remedy against the Library was a claim under Title 
I of the ADA, id. at *12, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *39, 
further noting that the plaintiff did not refute the Library’s
8
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Case: 11-2215 Document: 166-1 Page: 9 01/29/2013 829536 57
contention that the plaintiff had not exhausted her 
administrative remedies under Title I. id. at *12 n.11, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *39 n.11. The district court then declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, 
and dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiff appeals.
DISCUSSION
"We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all of the complaint’s 
factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences 
in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Forest Park Pictures v. Universal 
Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 655 
F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2011)). The complaint must state a claim 
that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). ”A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). ”[A] dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is, at bottom,
a declaration that the plaintiff’s complaint and incorporated 
materials are insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.” Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 
122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2011).
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I. ADA Title II Claims Against the NYSLRS
A. Sovereign Immunity
The NYSLRS moved to dismiss on the basis of New York 
State’s and the NYSLRS’s sovereign immunity from suit. The 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that ”[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been 
interpreted as also barring suits in federal court against a 
state brought by that state’s own citizens. See Woods v. Rondout 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 
2006). Although NYSLRS is not itself a state, ”[t]he immunity 
recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states 
themselves to ’state agents and state instrumentalities’ that 
are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (quoting Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)).
"Congress may abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when acting pursuant to [Congressional] authority under 
Section [five] of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 5; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 
(2004)). Congress has purported to abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity from claims brought against them under Title 
II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202. However, the validity of
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this abrogation depends on "whether Congress acted pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority." Lane, 541 U.S. at 517
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), the
Supreme Court established a three-step process for analyzing
whether Congress has validly abrogated a state's sovereign
immunity from suit in the context of a particular Title II claim:
[A court must] determine . . . , on a
claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of 
the State's alleged conduct violated Title 
II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) 
insofar as such misconduct violated Title II 
but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
whether Congress's purported abrogation of 
sovereign immunity as to that class of 
conduct is nevertheless valid.
Id. at 159. Thus, if a plaintiff cannot state a Title II claim,
the court’s sovereign immunity inquiry is at an end. See
Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 172-73 (1st Cir. 2006) ("If the
State’s conduct does not violate Title II, the court does not
proceed to the next step in the [United States v. Georgia]
analysis. The claim ends.").
B. The "Reasonable Modification"
Requirement of Title II of the ADA
"The ADA was passed by large majorities in both Houses
of Congress [in 1990] after decades of deliberation and
investigation into the need for comprehensive legislation to
address discrimination against persons with disabilities." Lane,
541 U.S. at 516. "Congress found that ’individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of
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discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the 
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] 
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and 
practices . . . .'" Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th
Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(a)(5)). The ADA aims "to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1). "It 
forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three 
major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title 
I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, 
which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, 
which are covered by Title III." Lane, 541 U.S. at 516-17.
"Title II of the ADA[,’Public Services,’] provides that 
’no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity,[1] or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.’" 
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 153 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132). The statute "require[s] that covered entities make 
reasonable accommodations in order to provide qualified
1 The ADA "defines ’public entity’ to include ’any State or 
local government’ and ’any department, agency, . . . or other
instrumentality of a State.’" United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 
at 154 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)) (some internal quotation 
marks omitted).
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individuals with an equal opportunity to receive benefits from or
to participate in programs run by such entities.” Tsombanidis v.
West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To prove a violation of Title II, a party 
must therefore establish: (1) that he is a
"qualified individual” with a disability; (2) 
that he was excluded from participation in a 
public entity’s services, programs or 
activities or was otherwise discriminated 
against by a public entity; and (3) that such 
exclusion or discrimination was due to his 
disability.
Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2003).
A "’qualified individual with a disability’” 
is defined as "an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or 
the provision of auxiliary aids and services, 
meets the essential eligibility requirements 
for the receipt of services or the 
participation in programs or activities 
provided by a public entity.”
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 153-54 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(2)). "A public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis 
of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that 
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).2 
”[A] defendant need not make an accommodation at all if the
2 ”We have previously made clear that 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7) was intended to implement 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).” 
Hargrave, 340 F.3d at 38; see also infra note 5.
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requested accommodation ’would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the service, program, or activity.’” Powell v. National Bd. of 
Medical Examiners, 364 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
Typically, "the determination of whether a particular 
modification is ’reasonable’ involves a fact-specific, 
case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the 
effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the 
disability in question and the cost to the organization that 
would implement it." Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353,
356 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying same standard in Title III case as 
under Title II, see infra note 6). It is a factual issue 
"whether [a] plaintiff[’s] proposed modifications . . . amount to
’reasonable modifications’ which should be implemented, or 
’fundamental alterations,’ which the state may reject." Crowder, 
81 F.3d at 1485.
C. The District Court’s Decision as to Whether 
the Plaintiff is a "Qualified Individual"
The district court began its analysis of whether the
plaintiff adequately alleged that she is a "qualified individual
with a disability" by observing that New York State courts have
interpreted a similar filing deadline provision as
a condition precedent to the ripening of any 
rights" or entitlement to disability 
benefits, and have [concluded] that the 
statutory filing period may [not] be extended 
or waived by the State agency, even where the 
applicant claims that the disability giving 
rise to his or her claim for disability 
benefits also rendered him incapable of
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asserting his or her claim in a timely
manner.
Mary Jo C. , 2011 WL 1748572, at *8, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, 
at *24-*25 (citations and parenthetical description of cited 
cases omitted). Relying on our statement in Henrietta D. v. 
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003), that the ADA’s "use of
the term ’qualified’ suggests that [courts] must look not to the 
administration of the program for which the plaintiff is 
qualified, but rather its formal legal eligibility requirements," 
id. at 277 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-32), the court reasoned 
that because the filing deadline is deemed a condition precedent 
to eligibility under state law, the "plaintiff seeks a waiver of 
an essential eligibility requirement for receipt of disability 
benefits under [New York law], which the State courts have 
determined the State defendant is without authority to grant." 
Mary Jo C., 2011 WL 1748572, at *9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, 
at *27.
The district court then concluded that, unlike 
requiring "reasonable modification of the State defendant’s own 
rules, policies or practices over which it has discretion," 
”[r]equiring the State defendant to violate state law is not a 
reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.” Id., 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *27. For this proposition, the court 
relied principally on Herschaft v. New York Board of Elections, 
No. 00 CV 2748, 2001 WL 940923, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11801 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (denominated "NOT FOR PUBLICATION”),
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aff’d on other grounds, 37 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary
order), in which the court rejected a pro se plaintiff’s
requested modification of New York State’s deadline for gathering
signatures for an election nominating petition. Id. at *1, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11801, at *1. The Herschaft court opined,
without citation to authority, that
[A] two- to three-week extension[,] . . .
although not excessive in scope, is 
unreasonable simply because it would require 
the Board of Elections to violate a state 
statute requiring that signatures for 
independent nominating petitions be gathered 
and submitted within a certain time 
frame. . . . The Board of Elections has no
statutory authority to waive the requirement.
It is the Court’s opinion that an 
accommodation that would require a defendant 
to violate an otherwise constitutional state 
law is inherently unreasonable.
Id. at *6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11801, at *18-*19 (footnote
omitted). The district court also cited Aughe v. Shalala, 885 F.
Supp. 1428 (W.D. Wash. 1995), which reasoned that modification of
a federal statutory age requirement "would essentially rewrite
the statute, [so] it must be seen as a fundamental alteration in
the nature of the program," id. at 1432.
D. Analysis
1. Whether the Filing Deadline is an Essential
Eligibility Requirement. With respect to Title II’s requirement 
that a "qualified individual" meet the "essential eligibility 
requirements" of a covered program, the district court apparently 
concluded that so long as a mandatory eligibility requirement is 
set by a state statute, it will be an "essential eligibility
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requirement,” and any modification of it will work a "fundamental 
alteration” of the program. On appeal, the NYSLRS argues that 
"Title II does not require waiver of the essential eligibility 
requirements for state programs or receipt of state benefits,” 
NYSLRS Br. 13-14, and construes our opinion in Henrietta D. as 
deciding that "to state a reasonable modification claim under the 
ADA, the plaintiff must meet the ’formal legal eligibility 
requirements’ for benefits or services,” id. at 14 (quoting 
Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 277).
At the outset, we note that the portion of Henrietta D. 
cited by the district court and by NYSLRS arose in an entirely 
different setting from that presented by this case. There, the 
state defendant argued that it should be permitted to rebut the 
plaintiffs’ prima facie Title II claim by showing that "the 
plaintiffs are no less successful in gaining access to benefits 
than the non-disabled. Such a showing would suggest an 
alternative reason for the plaintiffs’ low rate of obtaining 
benefits: systemic problems that create obstacles to access for 
everyone.” Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 277. The issue we 
confronted was the meaning of the term ”benefits” in the 
statutory command that ”no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 
see 331 F.3d at 277.
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We concluded that the ADA "plainly define[s] benefits 
by reference to a plaintiff’s facial legal entitlements." 
Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 277. We reasoned further that ”[t]he 
statute’s use of the term ’qualified’ suggests that we must look 
not to the administration of the program for which the plaintiff 
is qualified, but rather its formal legal eligibility 
requirements." Id. In context, these statements cannot properly 
be read to define "essential eligibility requirements" as all 
"formal legal eligibility requirements." That issue was not 
before the Henrietta D. court. The only question there was 
whether the term "benefits" referred to the public program as it 
was in fact administered, or the program as it was intended to 
operate by law. See id. Although it looked to the statute’s use 
of the term "qualified" and the regulations’ use of the phrase 
"essential eligibility requirements" in order to construe the 
statutory term "benefits," id. at 277-78, the Henrietta D. Court 
did not construe the phrase "essential eligibility requirement" 
itself. We thus did not determine there that the phrase 
"essential eligibility requirements" as it is used in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(2) necessarily means a program’s "formal legal 
eligibility requirements." Because Henrietta D. did not resolve 
the issue before us, we must construe the relevant statutory 
language in the first instance.
Of course, "[s]tatutory analysis necessarily begins 
with the plain meaning of a law’s text and, absent ambiguity, 
will generally end there." Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d
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403, 406 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). At
the outset, then, we "review the statutory text, considering the
ordinary or natural meaning of the words chosen by Congress, as
well as the placement and purpose of those words in the statutory
scheme." United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the relevant
text defines a qualified individual as
an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices, the removal of 
architectural, communication, or 
transportation barriers, or the provision of 
auxiliary aids and services, meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public 
entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphases added). The text thus 
distinguishes between two categories of requirements: (1) rules, 
policies, or practices, which are subject to the requirement of 
reasonable modification, and (2) essential eligibility 
requirements, which are not.
The fact that Congress provided that "rules, policies, 
or practices" would be subject to reasonable modification, and 
contrasted this flexibility with the requirement that a qualified 
individual meet the "essential eligibility requirements" of a 
program within the same sentence suggests that Congress meant 
these categories to have different meanings. "Generally, 
identical words used in different parts of the same statute are 
presumed to have the same meaning. But where, as here, Congress
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uses certain language in one part of the statute and different 
language in another, the court assumes different meanings were 
intended.” Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 
2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts have therefore reasoned that essential 
eligibility requirements, unlike "rules, policies, [and] 
practices,” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), are not subject to reasonable 
modification or waiver. See Pottgen v. Missouri State High 
School Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(observing that when an individual cannot meet an eligibility 
requirement determined to be essential, "the only possible 
accommodation is to waive the essential requirement itself. . . .
[But] [w]aiving an essential eligibility standard would 
constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the . . .
program [at issue].") (footnote omitted); cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. 
Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) (”[T]he waiver of an essential
rule of [a golf] competition for anyone [under Title III of the 
ADA] would fundamentally alter the nature of [the] 
tournaments.").
”[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons[ is] that 
a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 
314 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see
also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("It is our duty
to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
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statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of the 
fact that Congress used the phrases "rules, policies, and 
practices” and "essential eligibility requirements" as two 
distinct categories, the application of this canon of statutory 
construction presents a fundamental obstacle to construing 
"essential eligibility requirements" to mean all "formal legal 
eligibility requirements," as the district court did and as the 
NYSLRS would have us do too.
The statute uses the phrase "essential eligibility 
requirements," not simply "eligibility requirements." Had 
Congress intended "all formal legal eligibility requirements" to 
be non-waivable, the phrase "eligibility requirements" would have 
sufficed; it would have been unnecessary to use the phrase 
"essential eligibility requirements." Title II applies to the 
"services, programs, or activities of a public entity," 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132, which, being public, will typically define their 
eligibility requirements wholly by applicable legal requirements. 
That is the case here -- all the relevant eligibility 
requirements for participation in the program are set by law. If 
"essential eligibility requirements" meant "all formal legal 
eligibility requirements," every eligibility requirement would be 
"essential" and non-waivable, impermissibly rendering the word 
"essential" superfluous. Therefore, the term "essential
21
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1 eligibility requirements” does not refer to all formal legal
2 eligibility requirements.3
3 Cases interpreting the "essential eligibility
4 requirement" language indicate that whether an eligibility
5 requirement is essential is determined by consulting the
6 importance of the requirement to the program in question. See,
3 NYSLRS argues that the "rules, policies, [and] practices" 
subject to reasonable modification under Title II do not include 
state statutes. See NYSLRS Br. 19 ("Title II . . . requires
reasonable modification only of 'rules, policies, or 
practices' -- not state statutes."). Our decision in Hargrave 
indicates, however, that the phrase "rules, policies, or 
practices" is not to be read so narrowly. There, the district 
court had found a Vermont statute to facially discriminate 
against individuals with mental illnesses when it allowed medical 
professionals to petition courts to invalidate durable powers of 
attorney executed by the mentally ill. 340 F.3d at 31-32.
Vermont argued that enjoining execution of the statute "would 
fundamentally alter programs of civil commitment in Vermont."
Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In rejecting this argument, we first observed that the 
relevant regulations required "'reasonable modifications in 
policies [or] practices' in order to avoid discrimination unless 
the modifications would constitute a fundamental alteration to 
the relevant 'service, program, or activity.'" Id. at 38 
(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). We noted that this language 
"mirrors" and "implement[s]" the definition of a "qualified 
individual with a disability" as "'an individual who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements
for . . . participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)). We 
rejected Vermont's fundamental alteration argument because 
"Defendants have failed even to assert clearly, much less show, 
that the injunction issued by the District Court would 
fundamentally alter Vermont's program authorizing and enforcing 
[durable powers of attorney]." Id. By implication, the Hargrave 
court discussed the relevant injunction of the state statute as a 
"reasonable modification[] to rules, policies, or practices," 
which did not constitute a "fundamental alteration" of the 
program. Id. Hargrave thus casts doubt on the state's argument 
that the phrase "rules, policies, and practices" never includes 
state statutes.
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e.g., Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930 (”[T]o determine whether [the 
plaintiff] is a ’qualified individual’ under [Title II of] the 
ADA, we must first determine whether the age limit is an 
essential eligibility requirement by reviewing the importance of 
the requirement to the interscholastic baseball program [at 
issue]."); id. at 929 (deciding that high school baseball 
program’s age limit was essential because ”[a]n age limit helps 
reduce the competitive advantage flowing to teams using older 
athletes; protects younger athletes from harm; discourages 
student athletes from delaying their education to gain athletic 
maturity; and prevents over-zealous coaches from engaging in 
repeated red-shirting to gain a competitive advantage. These 
purposes are of immense importance in any interscholastic sports 
program.”).4
4 Pottgen’s analysis of the importance of the age 
requirement is drawn from the Eighth Circuit’s discussion of 
claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 establishes a comprehensive federal 
program aimed at improving the lot of the handicapped. Among its 
purposes are to ’promote and expand employment opportunities in 
the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and 
place such individuals in employment.’” Consolidated Rail v. 
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 701(8)), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in DeVargas v. 
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1383-84 (10th Cir.
1990). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that ”[n]o 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
by any Executive agency . . . .” Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794.
Although the Eighth Circuit was discussing claims under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Pottgen court largely
23
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1 This reading is reenforced by the regulations
2 implementing5 the relevant section of the ADA, which require ”[a]
3 public entity [to] make reasonable modifications in policies,
4 practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
5 avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the
6 public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
7 fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
8 activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The regulations indicate
9 that "essential eligibility requirements” are those requirements
adopted its reasoning as to the Rehabilitation Act claims when it 
analyzed the Title II claims in the case before it. See 40 F.3d 
at 930-31. Other courts have looked to Rehabilitation Act 
precedent in deciding cases under Title II of the ADA because 
Congress intended that the ADA mirror the requirements of the 
Rehabilitation Act. See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 272 
(”[A]lthough there are subtle differences between these 
disability acts, the standards adopted by Title II of the ADA for 
State and local government services are generally the same as 
those required under section 504 of [the Rehabilitation Act] of 
federally assisted programs and activities. Indeed, unless one 
of those subtle distinctions is pertinent to a particular case, 
we treat claims under the two statutes identically.” (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
5 ”[T]he Attorney General, at the instruction of Congress, 
has issued an implementing regulation that outlines the duty of a 
public entity to accommodate reasonably the needs of the disabled 
[under Title II].” Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(footnote omitted). ”We have previously made clear that 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) was intended to implement 42 U.S.C. § 
12131(2).” Hargrave, 340 F.3d at 38. "The Supreme Court never 
has decided whether these regulations are entitled to the degree 
of deference described in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National 
Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Nevertheless, the Court has said that, ’[b]ecause the Department 
of Justice is the agency directed by Congress to issue 
regulations implementing Title II[,] . . . its views warrant
respect.’” Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., 465 F.3d at 751 n.10 (quoting 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1999)).
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without which the "nature" of the program would be "fundamentally 
alter[ed].” Id. These terms seem to us clearly to contemplate 
that some relatively minor eligibility requirements, even if set 
by statute, will not be deemed essential because they will not be 
necessary to prevent the fundamental alteration of the program's 
nature.
The Supreme Court’s decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. 
Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), further illustrates the point. The
plaintiff in Martin was a professional golfer with a disability 
that prevented him from walking an 18-hole golf course. Id. at 
668-69. He requested permission to use a golf-cart in 
contravention of the PGA’s rules as a reasonable accommodation 
under Title III of the ADA,6 and the PGA defended on the basis
6 Title III provides that ”[n]o individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns . . . or operates a place of
public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Courts have read 
the requirements of Title II and Title III as being consistent 
with each other:
The House Committee on Education and Labor 
indicated that Title II’s prohibitions are to 
be "identical to those set out in the 
applicable provisions of titles I and III of 
this legislation." H.R. Rep. No.
101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367. More specifically, 
the House Report on the ADA states that the 
prohibitions of discrimination on the basis 
of association from Titles I and III should 
be incorporated in the regulations 
implementing Title II. Id.; H.R. Rep. No.
485(III), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 474; see also Kinney v.
Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1073 n.6 (3d Cir.
1993) (legislative history indicates that
25
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1 that allowing use of the golf-cart would work a fundamental
2 alteration in the nature of the tournament. Id. at 670-71.
3 The Court began its analysis by observing two ways in
4 which a modification of the PGA’s rules might fundamentally alter
5 the tournament:
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
It might alter such an essential aspect of 
the game of golf that it would be 
unacceptable even if it affected all 
competitors equally; changing the diameter of 
the hole from three to six inches might be 
such a modification. Alternatively, a less 
significant change that has only a peripheral 
impact on the game itself might nevertheless 
give a disabled player, in addition to access 
to the competition as required by Title III, 
an advantage over others and, for that 
reason, fundamentally alter the character of 
the competition.
19 Id. at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
20 The Court reasoned that "the use of carts is not itself
21 inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf"
22 because "the essence of the game [is] shotmaking -- using clubs
23 to cause a ball to progress from the teeing ground to a hole some
24 distance away with as few strokes as possible." Id. at 683. It
Titles II and III are to be read 
consistently).
Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 
37, 47 (2d Cir. 1997), recognized as superseded on other grounds
by Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d
Cir. 2001). "Congress clearly did not intend to give public 
entities more latitude than private parties to discriminate 
against the disabled." Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 53 n.10 
(1st Cir. 1998); see also Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law 
Examiners, 226 F.3d 69, 78 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) ("In the context of
this case, title II and title III of the ADA impose largely the 
same requirements . . . ."). Therefore, relevant cases 
interpreting Title III, such as Martin, are instructive here.
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therefore concluded that "the walking rule is at best peripheral 
to the nature of [the PGA’s] athletic events, and thus it might 
be waived in individual cases without working a fundamental 
alteration." Id. at 689; see also id. at 690 ("A modification 
that provides an exception to a peripheral tournament rule 
without impairing its purpose cannot be said to ’fundamentally 
alter’ the tournament."). The PGA’s argument to the contrary 
that "all the substantive rules for its . . . competitions are
sacrosanct and cannot be modified under any circumstances [was 
for that reason] effectively a[n] [incorrect] contention that it 
is exempt from Title Ill’s reasonable modification requirement." 
Id. at 689. But "Congress intended that an entity like the 
PGA . . . carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter, of
the rule before determining that no accommodation would be 
tolerable." Id. at 691.
Rather than simply deferring to the entity providing 
the service in question, deeming the rules as set by that entity 
as "sacrosanct," id. at 689, and construing any modification of 
those rules as a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
service, the Martin Court undertook an independent analysis of 
the importance of a rule for the service in light of the 
service’s purpose to determine whether a requested modification 
would fundamentally alter its nature. Similarly here, we read 
the ADA to require us to analyze the importance of an eligibility 
requirement for a public program or benefit, rather than to defer 
automatically to whatever "formal legal eligibility requirements"
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may exist, no matter how unimportant for the program in question 
they may be.7
And, perhaps most fundamentally, reading "essential 
eligibility requirements" to mean all formal legal eligibility 
requirements seems to us to run counter to the ADA’s broad 
remedial purpose by allowing states to insist that whatever legal 
requirements they may set are never subject to reasonable 
modification under Title II of the ADA. Were we to adopt such a 
construction of the ADA, the class of "rules, policies, or 
practices" subject to reasonable modification under Title II 
would be vanishingly small, and nearly all eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of public services would be non­
waivable "essential" eligibility requirements.
"In the ADA, Congress provided [a] broad mandate" to 
"effectuate its sweeping purpose[ to] . . . forbid[]
discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of 
public life, [including] . . . public services . . . ." Id. at
675. "As a remedial statute, the ADA must be broadly construed 
to effectuate its purpose of providing a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities." Noel v. New York City Taxi and
7 Our citation to Martin should in no way be construed as 
conflating the status of the states’ sovereign function of law­
making with that of a private entity’s rule-making. But Martin 
persuasively indicates, along with the other considerations 
discussed, that Title II should not be construed to require 
automatic deference to a program’s formal legal eligibility 
requirements, however minor they may be.
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Limousine Comm'n, 687 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To adopt the NYSLRS's construction 
would be to render Title II effectively impotent, which would be 
contrary to the broad remedial purpose of the ADA -- an act that 
"has been described as 'a milestone on the path to a more decent, 
tolerant, progressive society.'" Martin, 532 U.S. at 675 
(quoting Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Finally, here, as the plaintiff and the amici point 
out, New York State already waives or extends the filing deadline 
for disability retirement benefits for certain classes of 
individuals: For example, an NYSLRS member on unpaid medical 
leave may file an application within a year after termination of 
employment, see N.Y. Ret. and Soc. Sec. Law § 605(b)(2), and an 
NYSLRS member with "a qualifying World Trade Center condition" 
faces no deadline whatsoever, see id. The fact that the State 
itself waives the deadline in the enumerated circumstances 
strongly suggests that the filing deadline is not "essential."
Cf. Martin, 532 U.S. at 685 ("[T]he walking rule is not an 
indispensable feature of tournament golf either. [The PGA] 
permits golf carts to be used [by non-disabled golfers] in 
[several of its tournaments other than the one in question].").
At this stage, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the 
filing deadline is an essential eligibility requirement, and 
therefore dismissal is inappropriate because it is not clear from 
the face of the complaint that the plaintiff's allegations are
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"insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim upon which 
relief may be granted." Halebian, 644 F.3d at 131.
As the plaintiff points out, "[t]his Court has not yet 
established a broad rule defining when requirements imposed by a 
state or local government constitute 'essential eligibility 
requirements' of a program [so] as to render an individual 
eligible for protection under Title II of the ADA." Pl.’s Reply 
Br. 4. Cf. Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 4 
(1st Cir. 2000) ("Although Title II of the ADA took effect on 
January 26, 1992, [as of August 2000,] there [was] sparse 
case[]law interpreting its scope and limits." (footnote 
omitted)). But we need not do so today. In the posture of this 
appeal, it is sufficient to conclude that the district court’s 
view that the ADA’s reference to "essential eligibility 
requirements" necessarily refers to each and every formal legal 
eligibility requirement imposed for participation in a public 
program or benefit is mistaken. In the context of a motion to 
dismiss, we ask only whether the complaint states a claim that is 
in this regard plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that it does.
2. Whether Waiving the Filing Deadline Would be a 
Reasonable Modification. The district court also concluded that 
"[r]equiring the State defendant to violate state law is not a 
reasonable accommodation as a matter of law." Mary Jo C., 2011 
WL 1748572, at *9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *27. The 
court’s construction of the term "reasonable modification" thus
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provided another ground upon which it granted the NYSLRS’s motion 
to dismiss. As a matter of both statutory construction and 
federal preemption, we must inquire whether Congress, when it 
enacted Title II’s reasonable modification provision, intended to 
require modification of state laws under certain circumstances, 
thereby preempting them, or whether it instead intended the 
reasonable modification provision to stop short of encroaching on 
state laws. See, e.g., DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 646 
F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[F]ederal preemption[] is a 
question of statutory construction . . . .").
Under the United States Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. 
art. VI, cl. 2. "Under the doctrine of federal preemption,
’state laws that conflict with federal law are without effect.’" 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating 
Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Altria Grp. Inc.
v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, (2008)). ”[T]he purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis." Cipollone v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "Absent clear congressional intent to the 
contrary, federal preemption of state law is not favored . . . ."
Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2007).
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"Congress may manifest its intent to preempt 
state or local law explicitly, through the 
express language of a federal statute, or 
implicitly, through the scope, structure, and 
purpose of the federal law." [N.Y. SMSA Ltd.
P’ship v. Town of] Clarkstown, 612 F.3d [97,
104 (2d Cir. 2010)]. Thus, preemption "may
be either express or implied, and is 
compelled whether Congress’ command is 
explicitly stated in the statute’s language 
or implicitly contained in its structure and 
purpose." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 496 F.3d at 95.
”[T]he ADA does not contain an express preemption 
provision . . . ." Rubietta v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
No. 08 Civ. 7117, 2012 WL 345909, at *4, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12047, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan 30, 2012). "Courts have recognized 
two types of implied preemption: (1) field preemption, where
Congress has manifested an intent to ’occupy the field’ in a 
certain area . . . ; and (2) conflict preemption, where state law
’actually conflicts with federal law.’" Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., 673 F.3d at 95 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
"An actual conflict between state and federal law 
exists when compliance with both federal and state regulations is 
a physical impossibility, or when state law is an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress." Marsh, 499 F.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). An actual conflict also exists "where 
federal law is in ’irreconcilable conflict’ with state law."
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Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 705 (2d. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)).
[W]hen the question is whether a Federal act 
overrides a state law, the entire scheme of 
the statute must of course be considered and 
that which needs must be implied is of no 
less force than that which is expressed. If 
the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be 
accomplished -- if its operation within its 
chosen field else must be frustrated and its 
provisions be refused their natural effect -­
the state law must yield to the regulation of 
Congress within the sphere of its delegated 
power.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 
(2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
"What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be 
informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and 
identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Id.
"Since preemption claims turn on Congress’s intent, we 
begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the 
text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to 
the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs." 
Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 
152, 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995)) (brackets omitted). At the outset, we find nothing 
in the statutory phrase "reasonable modification" to suggest that 
Congress intended to exclude modifications that require violation 
or waiver of mandatory state statutes in some circumstances. In 
light of the broad scope and purpose of the ADA, we think it
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unlikely that Congress would have hidden such a significant 
limitation in such an anodyne statutory phrase. When Congress 
did restrict the scope of the ADA, it did so explicitly. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12210 (explicitly excluding certain 
individuals from the definition of "qualified individual with a 
disability”); id. § 12111(5)(A) (excluding employers having fewer 
than fifteen employees from the coverage of Title I).
As noted above, ”[i]n the ADA, Congress provided [a] 
broad mandate” to "effectuate its sweeping purpose[ to] . . .
forbid[] discrimination against disabled individuals in major 
areas of public life, [including] . . . public services . . . ."
Martin, 532 U.S. at 675. "Congress found that ’individuals with 
disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the 
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] 
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and 
practices . . . .’" Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1483 (alteration in
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)). The ADA aims "to 
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title II of the ADA 
represents Congress’s attempt to apply this "clear and 
comprehensive national mandate" to the "services, programs, or 
activities," 42 U.S.C. § 12132, of "’any State or local 
government’ and ’any department, agency, . . . or other
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instrumentality of a State,'" United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 
at 154 (omission in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)).
And although Congress did not include an express preemption 
provision, it did include a provision expressly abrogating the 
sovereign immunity of the states. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202.
The "natural effect" of Title II's "reasonable 
modification" requirement, Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373, in light of 
the foregoing observations, requires preemption of inconsistent 
state law when necessary to effectuate a required "reasonable 
modification." Congress clearly meant Title II to sweep broadly. 
If all state laws were insulated from Title II's reasonable 
modification requirement solely because they were state laws, 
"state law [would serve as] an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in 
enacting Title II. Marsh, 499 F.3d at 177. Far from 
"provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), the ADA would be 
powerless to work any reasonable modification in any requirement 
imposed by state law, no matter how trivial the requirement and 
no matter how minimal the costs of doing so. We conclude that 
the ADA's reasonable modification requirement contemplates 
modification to state laws, thereby permitting preemption of
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inconsistent state laws, when necessary to effectuate Title II’s 
reasonable modification provision.8
Our conclusion is further supported by Hargrave.
There, as we have discussed, we upheld an injunction of a 
facially discriminatory Vermont statute. Vermont had argued that 
in the context of the statute and implementing regulation 
requiring states "to make ’reasonable modifications in policies 
[or] practices’ in order to avoid discrimination unless the 
modifications would constitute a fundamental alteration to the 
relevant ’service, program, or activity,’" Hargrave, 340 F.3d at 
38 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)), enjoining the law would 
fundamentally alter the program at issue. Rejecting this 
argument and upholding the injunction, we spoke of the "ADA’s 
preemption of these statutory provisions." Id. at 38 n.10 
(emphasis added). While the NYSLRS argues that Hargrave "did not 
hold that Title II preempted facially nondiscriminatory state
8 The same result obtains when considering whether "federal 
law is in ’irreconcilable conflict’ with state law." Levitin,
159 F.3d at 705. As discussed supra Part I.D.1, the relevant 
provision of the ADA distinguishes between two categories of 
requirements: "rules, policies, [and] practices" which are 
subject to reasonable modification, and "essential eligibility 
requirements," which are not. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). As we have 
seen, not all formal legal eligibility requirements are 
"essential eligibility requirements," which raises the 
possibility that, in certain cases, a state law may fall into the 
category of the "rules, policies, [and] practices" subject to 
reasonable modification. And if indeed a modification of a state 
law was found in a particular case to be a "reasonable 
modification" to a "rule[], polic[y], or practice[]," but the 
state law in question did not provide for modification in those 
circumstances, there would be an "irreconcilable conflict" 
between the dictates of the ADA and state law, necessitating 
preemption. Levitin, 159 F.3d at 705.
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laws or mandated waiver of such laws,” NYSLRS Br. at 21, it 
provides no persuasive reason why, in light of the concerns 
discussed above, Title II would preempt facially discriminatory 
laws in pursuit of its broad purpose, but fail to preempt state 
law when necessary to achieve a reasonable modification to 
accomplish the same broad goals.
Last, we observe that the proposition that the ADA 
preempts inconsistent state law when appropriate and necessary to 
effectuate a reasonable accommodation under Title II is also 
consistent with decisions from our sister Circuits. See, e.g., 
Barber v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1232-33 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (ultimately concluding that there was no conflict 
between state law and the ADA in the case before it, but 
observing that the court "in no way affirm[ed] the district 
court’s conclusion that ’[a]n accommodation that would have 
required defendants to willfully ignore or violate the law is per 
se not reasonable.’" (citation omitted)); Quinones v. City of 
Evanston, Ill., 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[The 
defendant] believes that it is compelled to follow the directive 
from the state, but the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
requires a different order of priority. A discriminatory state 
law is not a defense to liability under federal law; it is a 
source of liability under federal law." (emphasis in original)); 
Williams v. Gen. Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(similar). As the Ninth Circuit explained:
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The court’s obligation under the ADA . . . is
to ensure that the decision reached by the 
state authority is appropriate under the law 
and in light of proposed alternatives. 
Otherwise, any state could adopt requirements 
imposing unreasonable obstacles to the 
disabled, and when haled into court could 
evade the antidiscrimination mandate of the 
ADA merely by explaining that the state 
authority considered possible modifications 
and rejected them.
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We are mindful of the general principle that 
courts will not second-guess the public 
health and safety decisions of state 
legislatures acting within their traditional 
police powers. However, [under federal] 
antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA which 
require reasonable modifications to public 
health and safety policies, it is incumbent 
upon the courts to insure that the mandate of 
federal law is achieved.
22 Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1485 (citation omitted).
23 The NYSLRS argues that "Title II . . . requires
24 reasonable modification only of ’rules, policies, or practices’
25 -- not state statutes," NYSLRS Br. 19, and seeks to distinguish
26 Crowder, which contemplated the modification of a mandatory
27 Hawaii State administrative regulation rather than a state
28 statute, see Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1481-85, on this ground, NYSLRS
29 Br. 21 n.6. But as a general rule, duly promulgated state
30 regulations have the force of law for these purposes as do
31 statutes. See, e.g., State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai’i 319, 331, 984
32 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) (Under Hawaii law, ”[a]dministrative rules,
33 like statutes, have the force and effect of law.”); Allstate Ins.
34 Co. v. Rivera, 12 N.Y.3d 602, 608, 911 N.E.2d 817, 820, 883
35 N.Y.S.2d 755, 758 (2009) (under New York law, ”[a] duly
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promulgated regulation . . . has the force of law.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). From the standpoint of the ADA’s 
preemptive force, we can discern no reason to distinguish between 
the preemption of state statutes and state regulations. Cf. 
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 n.6 (noting that ”a variety of state laws 
and regulations may conflict with a federal statute” and be 
preempted). And for the reasons discussed above, we do not read 
the ADA to prohibit reasonable modifications to state statutes 
when appropriate.
We have examined NYSLRS’s other arguments regarding 
Title II and find them unpersuasive.
We therefore conclude that the district court erred in 
dismissing the plaintiff’s Title II claim against the NYSLRS on 
the ground that ”[r]equiring the State defendant to violate state 
law is not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.” Mary 
Jo C., 2011 WL 1748572, at *9, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *27. 
Because ”the determination of what constitutes reasonable 
modification is [a] highly fact-specific, . . . case-by-case
inquiry,” ”[w]hether the plaintiff[’s] proposed alternative” to 
New York’s filing deadline ”constitute[s] [a] reasonable 
modification[] or [a] fundamental alteration[] cannot be 
determined as a matter of law on the record before us.” Crowder, 
81 F.3d at 1485; see also McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 
1259, 1270 (9th Cir. 2004) (”[T]he question of what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA ’requires a fact-specific, 
individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s
39
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case: 11-2215 Document: 166-1 Page: 40 01/29/2013 829536 57
circumstances and the accommodations that might allow him to meet
the program’s standards.’” (quoting Wong v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999)).
E. The District Court’s Decision as to Whether the
Plaintiff Adequately Alleged that She is Disabled
Again: Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (emphasis added). A "disability" is defined as "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). "Major life
activities" are further defined to include "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Although neither defendant argued to the district court
that the plaintiff had failed to plead adequately that she was
"disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, the district court
considered the issue sua sponte. It concluded:
The complaint does not sufficiently allege 
that plaintiff has a "disability" within the 
meaning of the ADA. Although plaintiff 
alleges that she has suffered from an
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unidentified mental illness since 
adolescence, she does not allege any 
additional facts plausibly suggesting that 
such mental illness substantially limited one 
or more of her major life activities.
Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint does not 
state a cognizable claim under Title II of 
the ADA. See, e.g., Tylicki v. St. Onge, 297 
F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2008)
(finding that the plaintiff’s complaint did 
not adequately plead a disability under Title 
II of the ADA where it contained no 
allegations describing how his supposed 
mental condition substantially limited a 
major life activity).
Mary Jo C., 2011 WL 1748572, at *7, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567,
at *21.
Although the district 
possible for plaintiff to amend 
sufficiently plead this element 
those claims would otherwise be
court noted that it "would be 
her Title II claims to 
as against the Library unless 
futile," id. at *10 n.7, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *33 n.7, it did not afford the
plaintiff this opportunity because it concluded that all of the 
plaintiff’s claims against both defendants were barred on other 
sufficient, independent grounds.
On appeal, the plaintiff submits that "the failure to 
provide her with an opportunity to present evidence of disability 
can be cured by the usual practice of this Court to grant a party 
leave to amend the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Pl.’s 
Br. 17 (citing Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 118 
(2d Cir. 2007) (”[W]hen a motion to dismiss is granted, the usual 
practice is to grant leave to amend the complaint.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).
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Inasmuch as the district court thought that it "would 
be possible" for the plaintiff to amend her allegations regarding 
her disability such that at least some claims could go forward, 
Mary Jo C., 2011 WL 1748572, at *10 n.7, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
49567, at *33 n.7, in light of the fact that the plaintiff has 
now requested leave to amend on appeal, and since our decision 
today removes the futility the district court saw in allowing the 
plaintiff to amend her complaint (at least as to claims against 
the NYSLRS), we decline to pass on the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s allegations of disability on appeal. Instead, we 
vacate the district court’s decision in this regard, and remand 
with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to 
amend her complaint to plead adequate allegations of disability 
if such a motion is made.
F. Title II’s Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
NYSLRS argues that even if the plaintiff can state a 
claim against it under Title II, Title II "fails to validly 
abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity for the reasonable 
modification claim made here." NYSLRS Br. 22. The plaintiff 
responds that, ”[a]s appellant Mary Jo C. seeks injunctive relief 
in connection with her claim against NYSLRS, this Court can avoid 
adjudication of the Eleventh Amendment issue by permitting the 
appellant to amend her complaint to" name a state official in his 
official capacity as a defendant. Pl.’s Reply Br. 13.
"Under the well-known exception to [the Eleventh 
Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity from suit] first set
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forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), . . . ’a plaintiff
may sue a state official acting in his official capacity -­
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment -- for prospective, 
injunctive relief from violations of federal law.'" State 
Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 
617 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72
(2d Cir. 2009) (similar).
Because of our well-settled policy of avoiding the 
unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues, see generally 
Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1052 (1999), and because the NYSLRS concedes that the
"plaintiff could potentially seek injunctive relief from the 
State Comptroller under Ex parte Young," NYSLRS Supp. Br. 17, we 
decline to address the constitutionality of Title Il's abrogation 
of the State's sovereign immunity, and remand with instructions 
to the district court to allow the plaintiff leave to amend her 
complaint in an attempt to invoke the doctrine of Ex parte Young.
II. Title II Claim Against the Library 
A. The District Court's Decision
The plaintiff also asserted a claim against the Library 
alleging that its failure to file an application on her behalf or 
to reclassify her termination as an unpaid leave of absence 
violated Title II of the ADA. As noted, the ADA "forbids 
discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major 
areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of
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the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are 
the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are 
covered by Title III.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 516-17. The district 
court dismissed this claim because it concluded that the 
plaintiff, an employee of the Library, could bring a claim 
against her employer under Title I of the ADA but not under Title 
II.
Title I of the ADA, "employment," provides in pertinent 
part that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
Title I applies to government employers, which are "covered 
entities."9
Noting that the "Supreme Court" and "the Second Circuit 
ha[ve] not expressly considered th[e] issue" of whether Title II 
applies to employment discrimination, Mary Jo C., 2011 WL 
1748572, at *11-*12, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *36, and
9 The term "covered entity" is defined to include an 
"employer," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), which in turn is defined to 
include a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who 
has 15 or more employees." Id. § 12111(5)(A). The statute 
further defines "person" as including, see id. § 12111(7); id. § 
12111(5)(B), non-federal "governments, governmental agencies, 
[and] political subdivisions," id. § 2000e(a), and defines 
"industry affecting commerce as including "any governmental 
industry, business, or activity," id. § 2000e(h), see generally 
Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th 
Cir. 1999).
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acknowledging that "courts are split” on the issue, id. at *11,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *35, the district court followed
what it described as the "well-reasoned decisions of the most
recent district court cases in this Circuit," to conclude that
"Title I of the ADA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination against the Library, all of which relate
to the ’terms, conditions, and privileges of [her] employment’
with that entity," id. at *12, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at
*39 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
The district court also cited Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t
of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999), as the leading case
concluding that public employees’ exclusive remedy against their
employers under the ADA is Title I. Zimmerman concluded that
"Congress unambiguously expressed its intent for Title II not to
apply to employment." Id. at 1173. It reasoned that a "common
understanding" of the term "services, programs, or activities" in
Title II’s command that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity," referred "only to
the ’outputs’ of a public agency, not to ’inputs’ such as
employment." Id. at 1174.
First, employment by a public entity is not 
commonly thought of as a "service, program, 
or activity of a public entity." Second, the 
"action" words in the sentence presuppose 
that the public entity provides an output 
that is generally available, and that an
45
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individual seeks to participate in or receive 
the benefit of such an output.
Consider, for example, how a Parks Department 
would answer the question, "What are the 
services, programs, and activities of the 
Parks Department?” It might answer, ”We 
operate a swimming pool; we lead nature 
walks; we maintain playgrounds.” It would 
not answer, ”We buy lawnmowers and hire 
people to operate them.” The latter is a 
means to deliver the services, programs, and 
activities of the hypothetical Parks 
Department, but it is not itself a service, 
program, or activity of the Parks Department.
Similarly, consider how a member of the 
public would answer the question, ”What are 
the services, programs, and activities of the 
Parks Department in which you want to 
participate, or whose benefits you seek to 
receive?” The individual might answer, ”I 
want to participate in the Wednesday night 
basketball league, or find out about the free 
children’s programs for the summer months.” 
The individual would not logically answer, ”I 
want to go to work for the Parks Department.”
27 The Zimmerman court concluded that "when viewed as a
28 whole, the text, context and structure of the ADA show
29 unambiguously that Congress did not intend for Title II to apply
30 to employment. Under these circumstances, we do not resort to
31 legislative history, and we do not defer to the Attorney
32 General’s regulation,” id. at 1178, which provides that Title II
33 does apply to employment actions against public employers, see 28
34 C.F.R. § 35.140(a). Contra Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil &
35 Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 1998)
36 (''Extensive legislative commentary regarding the applicability of
37 Title II to employment discrimination [in the ADA’s legislative
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history] . . . is so pervasive as to belie any contention that
Title II does not apply to employment actions.”)
In addition to cases following Zimmerman’s analysis, 
the district court noted dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001):
[N]o party has briefed the question of 
whether Title II of the ADA . . . is
available for claims of employment 
discrimination when Title I of the ADA 
expressly deals with that subject. See, 
e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23 (1983) (”[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 360 n.1. Like the district court here, other district
courts in this Circuit have cited this language before reaching
the conclusion that Title II does not apply to employee claims
against a public employer. See Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
B. Analysis
”[S]tatutory analysis necessarily begins with the plain 
meaning of the law’s text, and, absent ambiguity, will generally 
end there.” Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2010)
(internal
ascertain
structure
intent.”
quotation marks omitted). "’Because our task is to 
Congress’s intent, we look first to the text and 
of the statute’ as the surest guide to congressional 
Trustees of Local 138 Pension Trust Fund v. F.W.
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Honerkamp Co., 692 F.3d 127, 134(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lindsay 
v. Ass'n of Prof'l Flight Attendants, 581 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
2009)). We are persuaded primarily by the structure of the ADA, 
including differences between Title I and Title II, that Congress 
did not intend to extend Title II to employment discrimination 
claims, at least not those that are covered by Title I, see infra 
note 12 and accompanying text. See Allard K. Lowenstein Intern. 
Human Rights Project v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 626 F.3d 678, 681 
(2d Cir. 2010) ("Beginning, as we must, with the plain meaning of 
the statute's text and structure, we see no ambiguity.").
The ADA is divided into five separate titles: Title
I, "Employment"; Title II, "Public Services"; Title III, "Public 
Accommodations"; Title IV, "Telecommunications"; and Title V, 
"Miscellaneous Provisions." Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 327-28 (1990). "'[T]he
title of a statute and the heading[s] of [its] section[s]' are 
'tools available for the resolution of a doubt' about the meaning 
of a statute." Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 
234 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S.
519, 528-29 (1947)). As the Supreme Court indicated in dicta in 
Garrett, the fact that "Title I of the ADA expressly deals with 
th[e] subject" of employment discrimination, whereas Title II 
"deal[s] with the 'services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity,'" 531 U.S. at 360 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132), 
suggests that Congress did not intend Title II to reach 
employment discrimination, see id. (citing Russello, 464 U.S. at
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23 (”[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). And reflecting Congress's decision 
to separate the ADA into distinct titles covering different kinds 
of discrimination, the Supreme Court has described the ADA as 
”forbid[ding] discrimination against persons with disabilities in 
three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by 
Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and 
activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public 
accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Lane, 541 U.S. 
at 516-17.
The division between Titles I and II is further 
illustrated by their differing definitions of a "qualified 
individual.” Title I’s definition speaks in terms of employment: 
"As used in [Title I,] . . . ’qualified individual’ means an
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). But 
Title II defines the same term instead as an individual who 
”meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
services or the participation in programs or activities provided 
by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2).
Moreover, Title I prohibits discrimination by a 
''covered entity,” which it defines as, inter alia, ”an employer,”
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id. § 12111(2), whereas Title II prohibits discrimination by a 
"public entity,” which it defines as, inter alia, "any State or 
local government [or agency thereof]," id. § 12131(1). Thus, 
"Title II does not include any definition relevant to 
employ[ment], [by contrast with] Title I[]." Cormier v. City of 
Meriden, No. 03 Cv. 1819, 2004 WL 2377079, at *4, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21104, at *15 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004).
Also, Congress delegated the authority to promulgate 
regulations under the two titles to two different agencies.
Title I gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the 
authority to promulgate regulations interpreting that title. 42 
U.S.C. § 12116. But Title II entrusts the Attorney General with 
that responsibility. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a). See also Zimmerman, 
170 F.3d at 1178. And the fact that Congress included no 
direction that the two agencies work together to avoid imposing 
inconsistent standards governing employment discrimination suits 
suggests "that it did not intend for the Attorney General to have 
any power over employment under Title II; it never envisioned 
that there could be a conflict." Id.
Title I also imposes various limitations on suits 
against an employer which are absent from Title II. While Title 
I caps the amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff may recover 
depending on the number of employees employed by the defendant 
employer, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), and disallows punitive damages 
in suits against governmental employers, id. § 1981a(b)(1),
"Title II has no such limitations," Cormier, 2004 WL 2377079, at
50
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1 *7, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104, at *26. And although plaintiffs
2 filing suit under Title I must first exhaust administrative
3 remedies,10 it appears that those filing suit under Title II need
4 not do so, although we find a conclusion on the point unnecessary
5 to decide this case.11 It is an "elementary canon of
10 Title I incorporates the exhaustion requirement imposed 
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
ADA Title I incorporates various provisions 
from Title VII of the landmark Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. . . . One of these
provisions . . . requires a claimant to file
a charge of employment discrimination with 
the EEOC within 180 days after the 
discriminatory act. See [42 U.S.C.]
§ 2000e-5(e)(1).
McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d
Cir. 2007).
11 Title II adopts the "remedies, procedures, and rights set
forth" in the Rehabilitation Act at 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12133. Courts have construed that section of the 
Rehabilitation Act as not imposing any exhaustion requirement as 
to claims against a recipient of federal funding, but as imposing 
one as to claims against a federal employer. See, e.g., Ryan v. 
Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 
1253-54 (D. Kansas 2006). But "Title II of the ADA is not
applicable to the federal government," Cellular Phone Taskforce 
v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000), so it would appear 
that Title II only incorporates the Rehabilitation Act’s 
procedures applicable to recipients of federal funding, and thus 
does not impose an exhaustion requirement. Other courts have 
concluded that Title II contains no exhaustion requirement. See 
Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 824 (”[T]he regulations . . . plainly state
that exhaustion is not required." (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.172, 
Appendix A ("At any time, the complainant may file a private suit 
pursuant to section 203 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. [§] 12133, whether 
or not the designated agency finds a violation."))).
In Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565 
(2d Cir. 2003), we strongly suggested that Title II does not 
impose an exhaustion requirement.
It may be that once the governmental entity 
denies . . . an accommodation, [Title II of]
the ADA [does not] require a plaintiff to
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construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to 
render one part inoperative.” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985), (quoting Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)). ”[A]pplying Title II to
public employees would nullify these statutory limits for a 
significant category of employment discrimination plaintiffs.” 
Cormier, 2004 WL 2377079, at *7, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104, at 
*26. As the Seventh Circuit put it in a similar context -- while 
analyzing the Rehabilitation Act -- ”it would make no sense for 
Congress to provide . . . different sets of remedies, having
different exhaustion requirements, for the same wrong committed 
by the same employer.” McGuinness v. U.S. Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 
1318, 1321 (7th Cir. 1984).
exhaust the state or local administrative 
procedures. But a plaintiff must first use 
the procedures available to notify the 
governmental entity that it seeks an 
exception or variance from the facially 
neutral laws when pursuing a reasonable 
accommodation claim.
This is not an exhaustion requirement but 
merely a requirement that plaintiffs first 
use the proper procedure to seek an exception 
or variance. If denied this request, they do 
not need to exhaust the administrative appeal 
process.
Id. at 579 & n.8 (emphasis in original); see also Cormier, 2004 
WL 2377079, at *6, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104, at *22-*23 (”The 
Second Circuit has not decided the issue, but has suggested that 
Title II may not require exhaustion.”). However, out of an 
abundance of caution, and because plaintiff does not argue 
otherwise, we assume for present purposes but do not decide that 
Title II imposes no exhaustion requirement.
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”[W]e are required to disfavor interpretations of 
statutes that render language superfluous.” Conn. ex rel. 
Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Corley, 
556 U.S. at 314 (”[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons[
is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to 
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks 
and alteration omitted)); Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174 (similar). If 
a public employee were able to bring a suit against her employer 
for wrongful discrimination under both Title I and Title II,
Title I would apparently become superfluous in the context of a 
suit against a public employer employing more than fifteen 
persons -- compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Title I does not 
apply to an employer with fewer than 15 employees), with 42 
U.S.C. § 12131(1)(Title II applies to all municipal entities 
regardless of size) -- which is a construction we find highly 
doubtful. Even the plaintiff here concedes nearly as much. See 
Pl.’s Reply Br. 24 (”[T]he proffered interpretation of Title II
does not render Title I entirely redundant.”) (emphasis in 
original).
Accordingly, we conclude that the statute unambiguously 
limits employment discrimination claims to Title I. A public 
employee may not bring a Title II claim against his or her
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employer, at least when the defendant employer employs fifteen or 
more employees.12
The plaintiff argues that we, like the Bledsoe court, 
should consult Title II's legislative history. But, having found 
the relevant provisions of the statute unambiguous, we do not 
have warrant to do so. See, e.g., Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132 (2002) (”[R]eference to legislative
history is inappropriate when the text of a statute is 
unambiguous.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 
(1994) (”[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear.”).
The plaintiff also argues that deference is due to the 
Attorney General’s regulations implementing Title II, which 
contemplate employment discrimination claims. See 28 C.F.R. § 
35.140(a) (”No qualified individual with a disability shall, on 
the basis of disability, be subjected to discrimination in 
employment under any service, program, or activity conducted by a 
public entity.”). But the Supreme Court has directed that before 
deferring to an agency’s regulations, a court must first employ 
"’traditional tools of statutory construction’ to determine 
whether Congress has expressed its intent unambiguously on the 
question before the court.” Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173 (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). ”If the intent of Congress is
12 We need not, and do not, decide here whether a Title II 
claim may be brought against a public employer employing fewer 
than fifteen employees inasmuch as the Library has represented 
that it has fifteen or more.
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clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. ”The 
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject administrative constructions which 
are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Id. at 843 n.9. 
Because we conclude that the statute is unambiguous, we do not 
consider the Attorney General’s regulations for this purpose.
The plaintiff also argues that our prior statement in 
Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 
37 (2d Cir. 1997), recognized as superseded on other grounds by
Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir.
2001), that the word "discrimination” in Title II is a "catch-all 
phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, 
regardless of the context,” id. at 45, establishes that we have 
already decided that Title II applies to employment. But, in 
relevant part, Innovative only addressed (and rejected) White 
Plains’ argument that Title II did not apply to its zoning 
decisions because "it contend[ed] that zoning does not constitute 
a ’service, program, or activity.’” Id. at 44. The question of 
whether Title II applies to employment discrimination was not 
before the Court.
And this statement must be considered in context.
Title II provides that ”no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The 
Innovative court first rejected White Plains’ argument on the 
ground that the word "activity” in the above quoted statutory 
text was broad enough to encompass municipal zoning decisions.
117 F.3d at 44. This reasoning was sufficient to reject 
completely White Plains’ argument, and would have been sufficient 
to decide the issue before the Court. But the Innovative Court 
then offered an alternative rationale for rejecting White Plains’ 
argument: that the statutory language "or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132, was a 
"catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public 
entity, regardless of the context,” 117 F.3d at 45. In any 
event, then, the statement in Innovative "was not essential to 
the Court’s holding because it was offered in the alternatively] 
and therefore it is [a] dictum that is not binding on us.”
Willis Mgmt. (VT.), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 243 (2d 
Cir. 2011).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title II claims against the 
Library.13
13 After dismissing the plaintiff’s Title II claim against 
the Library, the district court observed that ”Plaintiff does not 
seek leave to amend her complaint to assert a Title I ADA claim, 
nor refute the Library’s contention that she cannot state a valid 
Title I ADA claim because she failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to any such claim as 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).” Mary Jo C., 2011 WL 1748572, 
at *12 n.11, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49567, at *39 n.11. We do not
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s 
judgment of dismissal is vacated as to the plaintiff’s Title II 
claim against the NYSLRS. The case is remanded with instructions 
to the district court to grant the plaintiff leave to amend her 
complaint if she so wishes to allege facts supporting her claim 
that she was disabled, and to attempt to state a claim invoking 
the rule of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court’s 
judgment of dismissal is affirmed as to the plaintiff’s Title II 
claim against the Library. The district court’s decision to 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff’s state law claims is vacated for reconsideration 
depending on the course of the further proceedings contemplated 
by this opinion.
Costs of the plaintiff on appeal to be paid by NYSLRS 
to the plaintiff; the Library shall bear its own costs.
express or mean to imply any opinion on our part as to whether 
the plaintiff should be allowed to amend her claims against the 
Library on remand.
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